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ABSTRACT 
Modeling Oligopolistic Price Adjustment in Micro Level Panel Data* 
by Jürgen Bracht, Saul Lach, and Eyal Winter 
Consumer prices in many markets are persistently dispersed both across retail outlets 
and over time.  While the cross sectional distribution of prices is stable, individual 
stores change their position in the distribution over time.  It is a challenge to model 
oligopolistic price adjustment to capture these features of consumer markets.  In belief 
based models of price adjustment stores react to expected profits. The expectations are 
based on the observed vector of market prices in the previous periods.  In a 
reinforcement model of price adjustment, if a strategy has proven fruitful in the past, it 
is apt to be the strategy relied upon at the present.  We collect price data on a 
homogeneous consumer product in Israel.  We estimate the structural parameter of the 
models.  We find that the reinforcement model describes the data better than the belief 
based models. 
 
Keywords: Experiments; Information; Learning 
JEL Classification: C72, C91, D83 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Modellierung des Preisverhaltens in oligopolistischen Märkten mit Paneldaten 
Preise für viele Konsumgüter sind weit verteilt.  Dies gilt sowohl für die Verteilung 
über die Zeit als auch für die Verteilung zwischen den Verkaufsstellen.  Während die 
Querschnittsverteilung der Preise stabil ist, wechseln die einzelnen Verkaufsstellen ihre 
Position in der Verteilung über die Zeit.  Es stellt eine Herausforderung dar, diese 
Merkmale der Märkte für Konsumgüter zu modellieren.  Im Vermutungslernen bilden 
die Verkaufstätten Erwartungen über das zukünftige Preissetzungsverhalten der 
Konkurrenz.  Die Erwartungen basieren auf dem vorherigen Entscheidungsverhalten der 
Konkurrenz.  Im Bekräftigungslernen werden erfolgreiche Strategien gerne wiederholt. 
Preisdaten eines homogenen Gutes in Israel werden erhoben.  Die strukturellen 
Parameter der Modelle werden geschätzt. Bekräftigungslernen beschreibt das 
tatsächliche Entscheidungsverhalten besser als Vermutungslernen. 
                                                 
*  Juergen Bracht thanks Rajiv Sarin for encouragement. We thank the Central Bureau of Statistics 
in Israel for making the price data available for research. Juergen Bracht acknowledges financial 
support from the Center for Rationality, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 
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1 Introduction
Prices of consumption goods in Israel are dispersed, both across vendors at a point of time
and across time at a vendor. The distribution of prices across vendors is stable, however
vendors change their position in the distribution over time (Lach (2002)).
In this paper, we model the process of price adjustment of vendors. We estimate two
families of adaptive models. We intend to capture the feature persistent price dispersion,
observed in each of the markets analyzed in Lach (2002).
Imagine an industry with a small number of vendors, each selling an undiﬀerentiated
good. Consumers do not care from which vendor they purchase the good. The lower a
vendors price, the more consumers will buy the product at the vendor. The vendors are
rivals, and the actions (prices) of the rivals aﬀect how well a vendor does.
In the Þrst kind of model, each vendor makes a conjecture about the course of action of
the rivals in the next period. Given this conjectures, each vendor calculates the expected
proÞts he would obtain had he chosen prices from his choice set. The higher the expected
proÞt of an action, the more frequently the vendor will choose that action.
In the second kind of model, each vendor assesses how proÞtable an action has been in
the past. ProÞtable actions are more frequently repeated than unproÞtable ones. Action
similar to actions both chosen and proÞtable are also repeated frequently.
Heterogeneity emerges in response to the history from the way vendors dynamically
update.
We estimate the structural parameters of the models. We are able to obtain reasonable
estimates of the models. We Þnd that a single reinforcement model describe behavior
better than a family of belief based models.
2 Traditional models of oligopoly and a novel ap-
proach
In this section, we review standard approaches in microeconomic theory. Standard theory
models individual actors, Þrms or consumers, and describes the behavior of the actor
which is traditionally utility maximization by consumers and proÞt maximization by
Þrms. An institutional framework is described: what are the options the actors have;
what outcomes do the actors receive as a function of the actions of others; traditionally
the price mechanism and equilibrium analysis.
In standard models of oligopoly, a Þnite number of Þrms optimize i.e. they take into
account how their actions aﬀect the prices they face both directly and, through possible
reactions of their rivals, indirectly.
Various classic models of oligopoly are diﬀerentiated by conjectures that each par-
ticipant makes concerning the actions of its rival. One makes assumptions about the
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conjectures and then Þnds the corresponding equilibrium outcome. An equilibrium is a
point at which neither Þrm in the pursuit of maximal proÞt wishes to change its own
action, given the actions that it supposes others will take if it changes its own action.
Equilibrium analysis does not specify how the equilibrium is achieved. This is a caveat
as one might suspect that the actors do not have complete information about the demand
of consumers and the cost structure of their competitors. Thus, it is natural to look
at models of adaptation to describe and predict pricing. We model Þrms (vendors) and
consumer. We describe a single model of consumer choice and we deÞne two families of
models of vendor choice. The two kinds of models are distinguished by the way vendors
respond to historical information. In both models, vendors do not necessarily act in a way
that can be described as maximizing anything at all. The vendor searches hazardously
for ways in which to change. We describe the options the actors have. We describe the
outcomes the actors receive as a function of the actions of others. We embed vendors in an
environment where the vendors will act, interact, and change according to the behavioral
models posed. In both models, vendors are not necessarily in equilibrium.
3 Price data
The data are monthly retail price quotations for a homogeneous product obtained from
the Central Bureau of Statistics in Israel; the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is computed
using those kind of quotations.
The good is a durable good - a refrigerator. The good has a precise label (Amcor)
and physical attributes (model, size etc.) that make it easy for the person which collects
the price data at the store to identify it. We are able to ensure that the prices over
time correspond to the same physical product. The product is homogeneous as far as the
physical characteristics are concerned.
The data was collected in 3 cities in Israel: Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. 348
observations were sampled over 48 months; 179 observations in 2000 and 169 in 2001.
The minimum number of observation in a month is 13 and the maximum number of
observations is 161.
115 observations were collected at 5 vendors in city 11 (Jerusalem), 121 observations
were collected at 6 vendors in city 31 (Tel Aviv) and 112 observations were collected at
5 vendors in city 71 (Haifa)2. Vendors that are out of stock when visited by the surveyor
are assigned a missing value.
The data set has 5 variables: retail price in NIS, year, month, city identiÞcation and
vendor identiÞcation.
1In the year 2000, the sequence of the number of observations starting in January and ending in
December is: 16, 15, 15, 14, 14, 14, 15, 15, 14, 16, 16, 15
In the year 2001, the corresponding sequence is: 15, 15, 15, 14, 13, 15, 15, 13, 13, 13, 14, 14
2In city 11, the number of observations by store is: 20, 23, 24, 24, 24
In city 31, the corresponding number by store is: 19, 19, 20, 20, 20, 21
In city 71, the corresponding number by store is : 19, 22, 23, 24, 24
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We collect descriptive statistics of the variable data in the following table:
Time Range 2000-1 2000 2001
Minimum price 3800 4200 3800
Maximum price 9926 9926 5470
Mean price 4992 5248 4720
St. deviation of price 565 593 377
25% Percentile of price 4700 4890 4500
50% Percentile of price 4963 5170 4700
75% Percentile of price 5200 5490 4992
The observation with price equals to 9926 is an outlier. We will exclude this observa-
tion when graphing the data and when estimating the behavioral models.
Figure 1 in the appendix graphs the variables price and month, for the complete set
of data. It is evident that Lachs (2002) Þnding is uphold for our data set. Substantial
dispersion of the price of a homogeneous good exists and persists. Figure 2 graphs the
variables price and month sorted by the three cities. Note that the general Þnding of
substantial and persistent price dispersion is conÞrmed for the three subsets. Figure 3
graphs the variables price and month sorted by each store identiÞcation. Note that Lachs
(2002) Þnding that stores do change their position in the distribution of prices over time
appears to be uphold. Note also that there is habit: The probability of observing a
particular price does depend in a positive fashion on whether that price has been chosen
in the previous period. Figure 4 graphs the variables price and store. Note, once again,
that there is substantial price dispersion across time, for each of the sixteen stores.
Figures 5-8 graph the kernel density estimates of multivariate probability, for the
complete data set and for each of the three cities. These pictures collectively make the
point that there is a dependency between the price and the lagged price. The paper
attempts to discover the nature of the dependence.
4 Models of oligopolistic price adjustment
Vendors post prices in each period t. We denote by sij the price j set by vendor i. In
this section, we present two kinds of models of vendor choice: Belief based models of price
adjustment and reinforcement models of price adjustment. Both kinds of models share a
common model of consumer choice. We Þrst describe consumer choice. Second, we de-
scribe belief based price adjustment. Third, we describe adjustment of proÞt assessments.
4.1 Consumer choice
Let I be the set of vendors. Let Si denote the pure strategy set of vendor i ∈ I. Let
J be the Þnite number of strategies. Note that sij is an element in S
i. Let s(t) =
(s1(t), s2(t), ..., si(t), ..., sm(t)) be the strategy proÞle actually played by the m vendors in
period t.
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There are n consumers with reservation prices cl ∈ C. Consumer l chooses among the
vendors whose posted price is lower than the consumers reservation price. Consumer ls
probability of shopping at a particular vendor is proportional to his surplus. Formally, if
the actually posted prices in period t are given by s(t), then the probability, qli(t), that
consumer l shops at vendor i in period t is given by
qli(t) = 0 if cl < si(t)
qli(t) =
cl − si(t)P
k∈L cl − sk(t)
otherwise; where L = {i : si(t) ≤ cl}.
Note that the system of equations implies that the consumer shops at cheaper vendors
with (equal or) higher probability.
4.2 Vendor choice
4.2.1 Belief based models of oligopolistic price adjustment
In this subsection, we describe how vendors form conjectures about the pricing behavior
of the competition in the next period. Each vendor predict the price of each of his
competitors. After each repetition of the game, the expectations are updated. We describe
how vendors adjust their choice behavior according to their expectations.
Expected prices Each vendor i forms expectations about the prices vendors −i (i.e.
i = 1, 2, 3, ..., i − 1, i + 1, ...,m) will charge in the next period. Denote the vector of
expected prices by p−i(t) = (p1(t), p2(t), ..., pi−1(t), pi+1(t), ..., pm(t)). The expectations
are based on observed prices in the past (t = 1, 2, 3, ..., t− 1).
We illustrate how expectations about vendor i+1s pricing behavior are formed. Note
that the remaining vendors hold the same expectations. Let N i+1(t) denote a counter of
vendor i + 1s play. Initialize N i+1(t) = N(0). Let Ns
i+1
j (t) denote a counter of vendor
i+ 1s play of action si+1j . Set N
i+1(t) =
P
si+1j ∈Si+1 N
si+1j (t),∀t. The updating equations
of the counters are
N i+1(t) = ρN i+1(t− 1) + 1, for t ≥ 1, and,
for each si+1j , N
si+1j (t) = ρN s
i+1
j (t− 1) + I(si+1j (t), si+1j ), for t ≥ 1.
where si+1j (t) denotes the action actually chosen by vendor i+ 1 in period t, where ρ
denotes the discount factor of experience and I(a, b) = 1 if a = b and 0 otherwise.
The expected frequency of play of action si+1j by vendor i+ 1, after period t, is given
by
ks
i+1
j (t) =
N s
i+1
j (t)
N i+1(t)
.
Then, the expected price of vendor i+ 1 in period t+ 1, pi+1(t), is given by
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pi+1(t+ 1) =
X
si+1j ∈Si
ks
i+1
j (t) · si+1j .
Note that Cournot conjectures are a special case i.e. if ρ = 0, then pi+1(t+1) = si+1j (t)
i.e. vendor i+ 1 is expected to maintain the price posted in the previous period.
Choice behavior We denote by sij(p
−i) = (sij , p
−i) the price vector in which vendor i
posts as a price sij and he predicts vendors −is prices to be given by p−i. Let Di(sij(p−i))
be the expected number of consumers purchasing at vendor i posting price sij, given
the price vector p−i = (p1, ..., pi−1, pi+1, ... pm). Vendor is expected proÞt is given by
wi(sij(p
−i)) = Di(sij(p
−i)) · sij. The probability, πij(t+ 1), of vendor i playing action sij in
period t+ 1 is somewhat proportional to the performance of each action sij with respect
to period t prices. Formally,
πij(t+ 1) =
exp(β · w(sij(p−i)))P
sik∈Si exp(β · w(s
i
k(p
−i)))
where β is a payoﬀ sensitivity parameter.
Set of estimated parameters We estimate demand by determining reservation prices.
SpeciÞcally, we obtain an estimate of the maximum of reservation prices. Formally, let
the set of reservation prices be given by C = {α,α−g,α−2 ·g,α−3 ·g,...} where g = α/n.
We assume n = 100. We estimate α.
We determine the way in which expectations are formed by estimating the initial
counter N(0) and the discount factor of experience ρ. The initial counters for each
strategy are the same for each vendor i such that
Ns
i
j(0) = N s
i
k(0), ∀sij,∀sik,∀i.
Finally, we estimate the payoﬀ sensitivity parameter β.
4.2.2 Reinforcement model of oligopolistic price adjustment
We present a reinforcement model of vendors pricing behavior. The vendor associates
with each of his strategies a subjectively assessed proÞt. The subjectively assessed proÞt
represents the proÞt the vendor anticipates he will receive from the choice of the strategy.
After each repetition of the game, vendors receive proÞts and update assessments of
strategies. The assessments with greater similarity are updated in a more similar manner.
The labelling of the strategies provides some information about the similarity among the
strategies.
Let uij(t) be the subjective assessment of player i for his strategy j, s
i
j, at repetition t.
Let ui(t) be the vector of subjective proÞt assessments for each of a vendors strategies.
Let µij(t) be the actual proÞt, given s(t). To update assessments, the vendor takes a
weighted average of his assessment and the proÞt he receives :
5
uij(t+ 1) = u
i
j(t) + λ · f · (µij(t)− uij(t)), 0<λ<1, ∀sij ∈ Si
λ denotes an updating parameter. f : S × S → < denotes a similarity function3 such
that, whenever the function value equals 1, the player sees the two strategies as identical,
and, whenever the function value equals 0, the player sees no similarity. SpeciÞcally,
∀sik ∈ Si,
f(sij(t), s
i
k;h) = 1−
|sij(t)− sik|
h
if |sij(t)− sik| ≤ h
= 0 otherwise.
h denotes the window width. Note that we assume that the similarity function does
not change over time and it is the same for each vendor.
The probability, ωij(t), of vendor i playing strategy s
i
j in period t is somewhat propor-
tional to the assessment of each strategy sij. Formally,
ωij(t) =
exp(uij(t))P
sik∈Si exp(u
i
k(t))
Set of estimated parameters We estimate the maximum of reservation prices, α. We
assume n = 100. Let the set of reservation prices be given by C = {α,α− g,α− 2 · g,α−
3 · g,...} where g = α/n.
We estimate the updating parameter λ and the parameter h, the window width.
We assume that the initial assessments are given by
uij(0) = 0, ∀i.
4.2.3 SpeciÞcation of the strategy space of the vendors
In estimation, we specialize to the set of strategies Si = {2025, 2050, 2075, ..., 7000}, ∀i.
5 Estimation technique and result
5.1 Technique
One way to view the models of price adjustment is as forecasting rules that, given infor-
mation from previous rounds, predict vendors choices in the current round. We describe
the maximum likelihood estimation procedure that minimizes the error of the period to
period transitions. These transitions are based on the observed data on prices in the
current rounds. Vendors predicted probabilities are obtained as discussed above.
The maximum likelihood method uses a measure of closeness of predictions to actual
choices: log likelihood. Each player has 200 actions. Let D
sij
(t) = 1 if action sij is chosen
3This particular function is employed by Sarin and Vahid (2001).
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Table 1: Reinforcement learning, Data from 3 cities in Israel, 2000-2001
City 11
n −LL α λ h
115 4.7283e+02 1.1364e+04 9.5700e-06 1.6726e+01
City 31
n −LL α h λ
121 4.7056e+02 8.5715e+03 9.9817e-04 2.1578e+03
City 71
n −LL α h λ
112 4.8305e+02 4.0417e+04 1.5467e-05 4.8305e+02
by vendor i in period t, otherwise zero. Let probij(t) denote the probability that vendor i
choose action sij in period t. Let T denote the length of the repeated game. Let I denote
the number of vendors.
The likelihood function, the formula for the joint probability distribution of the data,
is
L(θ) =
IY
i=1
TY
t=1
200Y
j=1
probij(t)
D
sij
(t)(1− probij(t))1−D
sij
(t)).
In estimating the reinforcement model, let probij(t) = ω
i
j(t). In estimating the belief
based model, let probij(t) = π
i
j(t).
5.2 Estimation results
We estimate the three parameters of the reinforcement model using the maximum likeli-
hood technique. We use MATLAB R13s optimization procedure fminsearch. 1 reports
the estimation results of the reinforcement learning model on the data from the three
cities in Israel during the years 2000-2001. The model Þts the data equally well on data
from each of the three cities. The estimates of the maximum of reservation prices in NIS
are reasonable. The estimates of the updating parameter λ have the correct sign. We are
most interested in the estimates of the parameter h, the window width. The parameter
estimates informs us whether the vendors in the three cities see two strategies which are
close as similar.
For Jerusalem, the estimate of h is 16.73. The value means that assessments of all
strategies which are very close (in a range of 400 NIS) to the strategy actually chosen are
updated. For Tel Aviv and Haifa, the estimates of h indicate that all strategies in the
strategy set are updated after each repetition of the game.
We estimate the four parameters of the family of belief based models using the max-
imum likelihood technique. We use MATLAB R13 procedure fminsearch. The data is
Þt poorly by the belief based models; convergence of the optimization procedure is very
slow such that some doubt is cast on the reliability of the results obtained. Nevertheless,
2 reports the estimation results of the model on the data from the two cities in Israel
during the years 2000-2001.
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Table 2: Belief based learning, Data from 3 cities in Israel, 2000-2001
City 11
n −LL α λ ρ N(0)
115 5.8180e+02 1.8157e+04 1.3228e-05 5.7129e-01 9.9220
City 31
n −LL α λ ρ N(0)
121 6.0172e+02 1.9656e+04 1.70821e-05 1.2850e+00 -1.9912
With the caveat in mind, we note that estimates of the maximum of reservation prices
are reasonable. The estimates of the payoﬀ sensitivity parameter β have the correct sign.
The estimates of the initial counter N(0) for city 11 indicates that little weight is given to
experience obtained prior to play. The estimates of N(0) for city 31 has the wrong sign.
The estimates of the factor ρ for city 11 indicate that experience is discounted at a rate
somewhat between Cournot (ρ = 0) and Fictitious Play (ρ = 1). The estimates of ρ for
city 31 indicates that as play progress more and more weight is give to prior experience.
6 Conclusion
There is a growing literature in experimental economics on models of adaptation in game
situations. Collectively, these paper make the point that models of adaptation go a good
way describing human behavior in laboratory game situations. To name just three papers,
research in this direction is reported in Erev and Roth (1998), Feltovich (2000) and Sarin
and Vahid (2001).
In this paper, we model human behavior observed in the Þeld. Note that we, as
econometricians, do not know the structure of the game, but we have to estimate the
structure of the game being played. Consequently, our task is more complicated than the
task of an econometrician analyzing typical laboratory data. This paper explores a new
domain; there is very little research upon which to build an empirical model of pricing
behavior.
The econometrician might not be able to know the true structure of the game, but
neither might the players themselves. For instance, the players might have very little or
no information about the strategy set and payoﬀ function of their competitors.
Our behavioral models do not require that players have much information. This is an
appealing feature. In the reinforcement model, players need to know their strategy set
and the actual proÞt realized by chosen strategies. In the belief learning models, players
need to know their strategy set, the actual choices of their competitors and their own
payoﬀ function.
Our results while preliminary indicate that actual play is in accordance with reinforce-
ment learning.
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Figure 2: Graph of variables price and month by city
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Figure 3: Graph of variables price and month by store
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Figure 4: Graph of variables price and store
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Figure 5: Graph of kernel density estimates of multivariate probability
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Figure 6: Graph of kernel density estimates of multivariate probability
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Figure 7: Graph of kernel density estimates of multivariate probability
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Figure 8: Graph of kernel density estimates of multivariate probability
18
Bücher des Forschungsschwerpunkts Markt und politische Ökonomie  
Books of the Research Area Markets and Political Economy  
 
Andreas Stephan 
Essays on the Contribution of Public Infrastruc-
ture to Private:  Production and its Political 
Economy 
2002, dissertation.de 
Hans Mewis 
Essays on Herd Behavior and Strategic 
Delegation 
2001, Shaker Verlag 
Andreas Moerke 
Organisationslernen über Netzwerke – Die 
personellen Verflechtungen von 
Führungsgremien japanischer 
Aktiengesellschaften 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Silke Neubauer 
Multimarket Contact and Organizational Design 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Lars-Hendrik Röller, Christian Wey (Eds.) 
Die Soziale Marktwirtschaft in der neuen 
Weltwirtschaft, WZB Jahrbuch 2001 
2001, edition sigma 
Michael Tröge 
Competition in Credit Markets: A Theoretic 
Analysis 
2001, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Tobias Miarka 
Financial Intermediation and Deregulation:  
A Critical Analysis of Japanese Bank-Firm-
Relationships 
2000, Physica-Verlag 
Rita Zobel 
Beschäftigungsveränderungen und 
organisationales Lernen in japanischen 
Industriengesellschaften 
2000, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/zobel-
rita-2000-06-19  
Jos Jansen 
Essays on Incentives in Regulation and 
Innovation 
2000, Tilburg University 
Ralph Siebert 
Innovation, Research Joint Ventures, and 
Multiproduct Competition 
2000, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/siebert-
ralph-2000-03-23/  
Damien J. Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller (Eds.) 
The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in 
Europe and the Member States 
2000, edition sigma 
Jianping Yang 
Bankbeziehungen deutscher Unternehmen: 
Investitionsverhalten und Risikoanalyse 
2000, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Christoph Schenk 
Cooperation between Competitors – 
Subcontracting and the Influence of Information, 
Production and Capacity on Market Structure and 
Competition 
1999, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin 
http://dochost.rz.hu-berlin.de/dissertationen/schenk-
christoph-1999-11-16  
Horst Albach, Ulrike Görtzen, Rita Zobel (Eds.) 
Information Processing as a Competitive 
Advantage of Japanese Firms 
1999, edition sigma 
Dieter Köster 
Wettbewerb in Netzproduktmärkten 
1999, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
Christian Wey 
Marktorganisation durch Standardisierung: Ein 
Beitrag zur Neuen Institutionenökonomik des 
Marktes 
1999, edition sigma 
Horst Albach, Meinolf Dierkes, Ariane Berthoin Antal, 
Kristina Vaillant (Hg.) 
Organisationslernen – institutionelle und 
kulturelle Dimensionen 
WZB-Jahrbuch 1998 
1998, edition sigma 
Lars Bergman, Chris Doyle, Jordi Gual, Lars 
Hultkrantz, Damien Neven, Lars-Hendrik Röller, 
Leonard Waverman 
Europe’s Network Industries: Conflicting 
Priorities - Telecommunications 
Monitoring European Deregulation 1 
1998, Centre for Economic Policy Research 
Manfred Fleischer  
The Inefficiency Trap 
Strategy Failure in the  
German Machine Tool Industry 
1997, edition sigma 
Christian Göseke 
Information Gathering and Dissemination 
The Contribution of JETRO to  
Japanese Competitiveness 
1997, Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2001 
 
 
Fredrik Andersson 
Kai A. Konrad 
Globalization and Human Capital Formation FS IV 01 – 01 
Andreas Stephan Regional Infrastructure Policy and its Impact 
on Productivity: A Comparison of Germany 
and France 
FS IV 01 – 02 
Tomaso Duso Lobbying and Regulation in a Political Economy: 
Evidence from the US Cellular Industry 
FS IV 01 – 03 
Steffen Huck 
Kai A. Konrad 
Wieland Müller 
Merger and Collusion in Contest FS IV 01 – 04 
Steffen Huck 
Kai A. Konrad 
Wieland Müller 
Profitable Horizontal Mergers without Cost 
Advantages: The Role of Internal Organization, 
Information, and Market Structure 
FS IV 01 – 05 
Jos Jansen Strategic Information Revelation and Revenue 
Sharing in an R&D Race 
(A revision of FS IV 99-11) 
FS IV 01 – 06 
Astrid Jung Are Product Innovation and Flexible Technology 
Complements? 
FS IV 01 – 07 
Jonas Björnerstedt 
Johan Stennek 
Bilateral Oligopoly FS IV 01 – 08 
Manfred Fleischer Regulierungswettbewerb und Innovation in der 
chemischen Industrie 
FS IV 01 – 09 
Karl Wärneryd Rent, Risk, and Replication –  
Preference Adaptation in Winner-Take-All Markets 
FS IV 01 – 10 
Karl Wärneryd Information in Conflicts FS IV 01 – 11 
Steffen Huck 
Kai A. Konrad 
Merger Profitability and Trade Policy FS IV 01 – 12 
Michal Grajek Gender Pay Gap in Poland FS IV 01 – 13 
Achim Kemmerling 
Andreas Stephan 
The Contribution of Local Public Infra-structure to 
Private Productivity and its Political-Economy:  
Evidence from a Panel of Large German Cities 
FS IV 01 – 14 
Suchan Chae 
Paul Heidhues 
Nash Bargaining Solution with Coalitions and the 
Joint Bargaining Paradox 
FS IV 01 – 15 
Kai A. Konrad 
Harald Künemund 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Julio R. Robledo 
Geography of the Family FS IV 01 – 16 
Tomaso Duso 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
Towards a Political Economy of Industrial Organ-
ization: Empirical Regularities from Deregulation 
FS IV 01 – 17 
Kai A. Konrad Investment in the Absence of Property Rights – The 
Role of Incumbency Advantages 
FS IV 01 – 18 
Roman Inderst 
Christian Wey 
Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in 
Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries 
FS IV 01 – 19 
 
Kai A. Konrad 
Helmut Seitz 
Fiscal Federalism and Risk Sharing in Germany: 
The Role of Size Differences 
FS IV 01 – 20 
Klaus Gugler 
Dennis C. Mueller 
B. Burcin Yurtoglu 
Christine Zulehner 
The Effects of Mergers:  An International Compari-
son 
FS IV 01 – 21 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Odd Rune Straume 
Lars Sørgard 
Downstream Merger with Oligopolistic Input 
Suppliers 
FS IV 01 – 22 
Andreas Blume 
Paul Heidhues 
Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions FS IV 01 – 23 
Roman Inders 
Christian Wey 
The Incentives for Takeover in Oligopoly FS IV 01 – 24 
Klaus Gugler 
Dennis C. Mueller 
B. Burcin Yurtoglu 
Corporate Governance, Capital Market Discipline 
and the Returns on Investment 
FS IV 01 – 25 
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson 
Johan Stennek 
Why Mergers Reduce Profits and Raise Share 
Prices:  A Theory of Preemptive Mergers 
FS IV 01 – 26  
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPERS 2002 
 
 
Fredrik Andersson 
Kai A. Konrad 
Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
Extortionary States 
FS IV 02 – 01 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
Christian Wey 
Merger Control in the New Economy FS IV 02 – 02 
Talat Mahmood 
Klaus Schömann 
Die Determinanten der Mirgrationsentscheidung 
von IT-Hochschulabsolventen aus Pakistan –
Empirische Befunde zur Ausgestaltung der 
deutschen „Green Card“ 
FS IV 02 – 03 
Jos Jansen The Effects of Disclosure Regulation on Innovative 
Firms:  Common Values 
FS IV 02 – 04 
Jos Jansen The Effects of Disclosure Regulation on Innovative 
Firms:  Private Values 
FS IV 02 – 05 
Günter Franke 
Harris Schlesinger 
Richard C. Stapleton 
Multiplicative Background Risk FS IV 02 – 06  
Tomaso Duso On the Politics of the Regulatory Reform:  
Econometric Evidence from the OECD Countries 
FS IV 02 – 07 
Johan Lagerlöf 
Paul Heidhues 
On the Desirability of an Efficiency Defense in 
Merger Control 
FS IV 02 – 08 
Olivier Cadot 
Lars-Hendrik Röller 
Andreas Stephan 
Contribution to Productivity or Pork Barrel?  The 
Two Faces of Infrastructure Investment 
FS IV 02 – 09 
Justus Haucap 
Christian Wey 
Unionization Structures and Firms’ Incentives for 
Productivity Enhancing Investments 
FS IV 02 – 10  
Heidrun C. Hoppe 
Emre Ozdenoren 
Intermediation in Innovation FS IV 02 – 11 
Rainer Nitsche On the Effectiveness of Anti-Predation Rules FS IV 02 – 12 
Daniel Krähmer Entry and Experimentation in  
Oligopolistic Markets for Experience Goods 
FS IV 02 – 13 
J. Peter Murmann The Coevolution of Industries and National 
Institutions: Theory and Evidence 
FS IV 02 – 14 
Kai A. Konrad Terrorism and the State FS IV 02 – 15 
Robert Nuscheler Physician Reimbursement, Time-Consistency and 
the Quality of Care 
FS IV 02 – 16 
Fredrik Andersson 
Kai A. Konrad 
Taxation and Education Investment in the Tertiary 
Sector 
FS IV 02 – 17 
Jan Boone ‘Be nice, unless it pays to fight’: A New Theory of 
Price Determination with Implications for 
Competition Policy 
FS IV 02 – 18 
Kai A. Konrad Altruism and Envy in Contests: 
An Evolutionarily Stable Symbiosis 
FS IV 02 – 19 
Helmut Bester 
Kai A. Konrad 
Delay in Contests FS IV 02 – 20 
Kjell Erik Lommerud 
Bjørn Sandvik 
Odd Rune Straume 
Good Jobs, Bad Jobs and Redistribution FS IV 02 – 21 
Steffen Huck 
Vicki Knoblauch 
Wieland Müller 
On the Profitability of Collusion in Location Games FS IV 02 – 22 
Ralph Siebert Learning by Doing and Multiproduction Effects 
over the Life Cycle: Evidence from the 
Semiconductor Industry 
FS IV 02 – 23 
Jürgen Bracht 
Saul Lach 
Eyal Winter 
Modeling Oligopolistic Price Adjustment in Micro 
Level Panel Data 
FS IV 02 – 24 
 
 
 
  
Bei Ihren Bestellungen von WZB-Papers schicken 
Sie bitte unbedingt einen an Sie adressierten Auf-
kleber mit sowie je paper eine Briefmarke im Wert 
von 0,51 Euro oder einen "Coupon Reponse Inter-
national " (für Besteller aus dem Ausland) 
 Please send a self addressed label and postage 
stamps in the amount of 0.51 Euro or a "Coupon- 
Reponse International" (if you are ordering from 
outside Germany) for each WZB-paper requested 
 
Bestellschein Order Form 
 
 
 
 
Absender / Return Address: 
 
 
 
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
für Sozialforschung 
Presse- und informationsreferat 
Reichpietschufer 50 
 
D-10785 Berlin-Tiergarten  
 
 
 
Hiermit bestelle ich folgende(s) 
Discussion paper(s): 
 
 
 
Please send me the following 
Discussion paper(s): 
Bestell-Nr. / Order no. Autor/in, Kurztitel /Author(s) / Title(s) in brief 
  
 
